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COLLATERALLY ATTACKING THE PRISON 
LITIGATION REFORM ACT’S APPLICATION TO 
MERITORIOUS PRISONER CIVIL LITIGATION 
Melissa Benerofe* 
 
Earlier this year, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) reached its 
twenty-fifth birthday, reinvigorating discussion on its effects on people in 
prison and the U.S. criminal justice system more broadly.  This Note 
examines how the PLRA deters and obstructs prisoners’ ability to file 
meritorious civil rights lawsuits regarding the conditions of their 
confinement.  The PLRA does so primarily through four of its provisions, 
which this Note refers to as the “access provisions.”  The access provisions 
include:  (1) the exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) the filing fee 
provision; (3) the three-strikes rule; and (4) limitations on attorney’s fees. 
This Note argues that there is a need for states to counteract the PLRA’s 
application to meritorious prisoner litigation not only for the dignity and 
well-being of people in prison but also to improve prison conditions overall.  
This Note therefore proposes a broad framework to better ensure that 
prisoners have a fair opportunity to have their meritorious civil rights claims 
reach the court system and, further, succeed.  The framework requires states 
to:  (1) implement electronic grievance systems and (2) grant appropriate 
legal aid organizations that typically litigate prisoners’ civil rights cases 
with access to those electronic grievance systems.  This Note aims to 
encourage government actors and scholars to think more critically about 
how best to navigate a post-PLRA reality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nowhere else has the destruction of the unprecedented COVID-19 
pandemic been more deeply felt than throughout America’s prisons.1  Prisons 
are notoriously overcrowded and unsanitary, and they house populations that 
are disproportionately susceptible to illnesses.2  All of this coupled with 
 
 1. See Lee Kovarsky, Pandemics, Risks, and Remedies, 106 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 71, 73 
(2020) (“American criminal detention was ground zero for COVID outbreaks.”). 
 2. See id. at 73–74. 
2021] PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT 143 
initially inadequate responses at the federal3 and state levels4 have resulted 
in over 2600 prisoner deaths since the pandemic’s beginning.5  In an effort 
to prevent imprisonment from becoming a de facto death sentence, inmates 
across the country have flocked to the courts seeking relief,6 whether it be 
for compassionate release, transfer to home confinement, or on the basis that 
their constitutional rights have been violated by inadequate protections 
against COVID-19.7 
However, even in the present crisis, prisoner lawsuits alleging 
constitutional violations have been thwarted8 by the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act of 19959 (PLRA or “the Act”), an under-the-radar piece of Clinton-era 
legislation that has made it considerably harder for prisoners10 to challenge 
their conditions of confinement11 in federal court.12 
 
 3. See Kim Bellware, Prisoners and Guards Agree About Federal Coronavirus 
Response:  “We Do Not Feel Safe”, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2020, 2:16 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/08/24/prisoners-guards-agree-about-federal-
coronavirus-response-we-do-not-feel-safe/ [https://perma.cc/5CFR-RYUH]. 
 4. See Emily Widra & Dylan Hayre, Failing Grades:  States’ Responses to COVID-19 
in Jails & Prisons, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (June 25, 2020), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/failing_grades.html [https://perma.cc/S3A7-7QWM] 
(concluding that “despite all of the information, voices calling for action, and the obvious 
need, state responses ranged from disorganized or ineffective, at best, to callously nonexistent 
at worst”). 
 5. See A State-by-State Look at 15 Months of Coronavirus in Prisons, MARSHALL 
PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/01/a-state-by-state-look-at-
coronavirus-in-prisons [https://perma.cc/282K-YCEG] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021). 
 6. See Michael Gelb, ‘Dozens of Prisons’ Targeted in COVID-19 Civil Rights Lawsuits, 
CRIME REPORT (July 30, 2020), https://thecrimereport.org/2020/07/30/civil-rights-lawsuits-
target-prison-response-to-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/Z45U-DJ2V]. 
 7. See Ariane de Vogue, Covid-19 Cases Concerning Prisoners’ Rights Hit the Supreme 
Court, CNN (May 21, 2020, 7:01 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/21/politics/covid-19-
supreme-court-prisoners-rights/index.html [https://perma.cc/MRL8-J9CF]. 
 8. See, e.g., Valentine v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 1598, 1598 (2020) (mem.) (affirming the 
Fifth Circuit’s denial of an injunction which would require a Texas geriatric prison to make 
enhanced efforts to contain the coronavirus due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
pursuant to the PLRA). 
 9. Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–10, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to -77 (1996) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 10. The PLRA defines “prisoner” as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility 
who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of 
criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary 
program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h).  However, this Note focuses on individuals in prison or those 
who have already been convicted of a crime.  This Note uses the terms “prisoner,” “inmate,” 
and “person in prison” interchangeably. 
 11. The phrase “conditions of confinement” includes “all inmate suits about prison life, 
whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege 
excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 
 12. See John Pfaff, The 1994 Crime Law Hogs the Legal Reform Spotlight.  But a 
Lesser-Known Law Deserves More Attention, APPEAL (Oct. 2, 2019), 
https://theappeal.org/1994-crime-law-biden/ [https://perma.cc/RCV4-CCKF].  The PLRA 
does not apply to habeas corpus petitions and criminal appeals, as it is restricted to civil 
actions. See Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 634 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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In 1996, Congress enacted the PLRA in response to a perceived 
overabundance of frivolous13 inmate civil rights litigation, which Congress 
deemed highly costly for the federal court system and state governments.14  
While Congress’s stated intention in passing the PLRA was to curtail 
frivolous lawsuits,15 the Act has in fact deterred and obstructed the filing of 
meritorious civil rights lawsuits,16 resulting in a significant reduction of 
prisoner lawsuits in the federal courts.17  It has done so primarily through 
four of its provisions:18  (1) the administrative exhaustion requirement; (2) 
the filing fee provision, (3) the three-strikes rule, and (4) limitations on 
attorney’s fees.  This Note refers to these provisions as the PLRA’s “access 
provisions.”  This Note examines how these particular provisions deter and 
obstruct the filing of meritorious civil rights lawsuits, consequently 
diminishing the already lacking transparency of prison conditions 
nationwide. 
Part I discusses how prisons typically operate with minimal transparency, 
enabling troubling prison conditions to persist.  It then provides a brief 
history of how federal litigation improved state prison conditions, 
particularly from the 1960s to the 1980s.  Part I concludes by highlighting 
the rise in so-called “frivolous” prisoner litigation that culminated in the early 
to mid-1990s and served as the basis for the PLRA’s enactment. 
Part II describes the PLRA’s access provisions in detail and explores how 
these provisions deter and obstruct the filing of meritorious prisoner civil 
rights lawsuits.  In doing so, Part II concludes that the PLRA has tampered 
with the only real transparency mechanism for exposing prison conditions. 
Finally, Part III argues that there is a need to combat the access provisions’ 
application to meritorious prisoner civil litigation.  To address this need, Part 
III proposes that states implement a two-step framework.  This proposed 
framework takes a broad approach, so as to give the best chance for practical 
implementation.  More specifically, this Note argues that:  (1) states should 
require that prison grievance processes are conducted primarily via electronic 
means to ensure that all grievances are stored in an electronic database and 
(2) states should require that appropriate outside legal aid organizations be 
given access to those electronic grievance databases in order to facilitate 
attorney representation. 
 
 13. This Note uses the term “frivolous” to mean that which lacks an arguable basis in law 
or fact. 
 14. See infra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. 
 15. See 141 CONG. REC. 27,041–42 (1995). 
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
 17. See infra notes 250–52 and accompanying text. 
 18. The PLRA has several other provisions which are not the focus of this Note.  A few 
of those provisions include:  a requirement that a prisoner cannot bring a lawsuit without a 
prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); a 
screening provision whereby a court must dismiss a prisoner’s case if it determines that the 
complaint is “frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or 
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief,” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(c)(1); and provisions restricting the ability for federal judges to grant prospective 
relief, see 18 U.S.C. § 3626. 
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I.  BREAKING DOWN THE BARRIER BETWEEN PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC:  
THE IMPORTANCE OF PRISONER LITIGATION 
This part discusses how prisoner litigation has traditionally served as one 
of the only effective transparency mechanisms for prisoners to expose the 
realities of prison life to the outside world.  Part I.A briefly describes several 
barriers that prevent the public from knowing what occurs behind prison 
walls.  Given these barriers, Part I.B highlights how prisoner civil rights 
litigation is one of the only means to expose and improve prison conditions.  
Part I.C then provides context for the PLRA’s enactment by recounting the 
rise in so-called frivolous prisoner litigation. 
A.  Barriers to Public Access of Prisons 
State prisons in the United States house approximately 1.3 million people19 
and receive significant funding through taxpayer dollars.20  Despite the 
number of people and costs involved, state prisons remain “shrouded in 
secrecy.”21  In large part, this comes as a result of several barriers to public 
access, including geographic separation, limits on media access and external 
communication, inefficacy of public disclosure laws, and a general lack of 
independent prison oversight.22 
First, prisons are physically separated from the public at large.23  Typically 
located in geographically remote, rural locations,24 the heavily guarded and 
closed environment of prisons naturally hides them from public view.25  As 
one historian put it:  “Prisons are built to be out of sight and are, thus, out of 
mind.”26 
 
 19. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration:  The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON 
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html 
[https://perma.cc/QZ4D-EZCQ] (displaying slideshow showing 1,291,000 people in state 
prisons). 
 20. See Nicole Lewis & Beatrix Lockwood, The Hidden Cost of Incarceration, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/ 
2019/12/17/the-hidden-cost-of-incarceration [https://perma.cc/5ARC-PWE3] (noting how the 
United States spends more than $80 billion each year to keep roughly 2.3 million people 
behind bars). 
 21. Andrea C. Armstrong, No Prisoner Left Behind?:  Enhancing Public Transparency of 
Penal Institutions, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 435, 462 (2014). 
 22. See infra notes 23–39 and accompanying text. 
 23. See Michele Deitch, The Need for Independent Prison Oversight in a Post-PLRA 
World, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 236, 236 (2012) (“Prisons and jails are closed institutions, both 
literally and symbolically, and they operate far away from public view.”). 
 24. See Laura Rovner, On Litigating Constitutional Challenges to the Federal Supermax:  
Improving Conditions and Shining a Light, 95 DENV. L. REV. 457, 461 (2018). 
 25. David C. Fathi, The Challenge of Prison Oversight, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1453, 1453 
(2010). 
 26. Heather Ann Thompson, What’s Hidden Behind the Walls of America’s Prisons, 
CONVERSATION (June 4, 2017, 9:45 PM), https://theconversation.com/whats-hidden-behind-
the-walls-of-americas-prisons-77282 [https://perma.cc/CU2H-SYVR]. 
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Second, media access to prisons is limited and subject to the discretion of 
corrections officials.27  Additionally, although incarcerated people can 
communicate with members of the public, external prisoner communication 
remains subject to prison surveillance, making it difficult to obtain an 
unfiltered prisoner viewpoint.28 
Third, public disclosure laws do not provide full transparency of prison 
conditions.  In addition to the Freedom of Information Act29 (FOIA), which 
governs the disclosure of government records at the federal level, all fifty 
states have open records statutes, many of which are modeled off FOIA.30  
These statutes are meant to embody a commitment to openness and 
transparency.31  However, state departments of correction (DOCs) often take 
long to respond to disclosure requests or fail to respond altogether.32  In 
addition, DOCs frequently rely on statutory exemptions in public disclosure 
laws, which often preclude public access to information regarding law 
enforcement.33  The common response to an open records request about 
prison conditions is that public access to the requested documents would 
“threaten the security of the institution” by possibly resulting in “prison riots, 
public disturbances, and increases in violent crime within prison walls.”34  
Thus, in the prison context, public disclosure laws do not freely grant the 
public access to information about prison conditions.35 
 
 27. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbot, 490 U.S. 401, 413 (1989); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 
78, 89 (1987); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827–28 (1974); see also Rovner, supra note 
24, at 462–63. 
 28. Demetria D. Frank, Prisoner-to-Public Communication, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 115, 117 
(2018). 
 29. 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
 30. See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation:  Public Records, Privacy and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (2002); see also Christina Koningisor, 
Transparency Deserts, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1461, 1506 (2020) (stating that while many state 
public records statutes have adopted certain parts or features of FOIA, each state law remains 
unique). 
 31. See Solove, supra note 30, at 1161. 
 32. See, e.g., Sarah Geraghty & Melanie Velez, Bringing Transparency and 
Accountability to Criminal Justice Institutions in the South, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 455, 
461–62 (2011) (explaining how the Alabama DOC continuously ignored Open Records Act 
requests for months and only provided the requested documents after repeated threats of 
litigation); Florida Department of Corrections Sued over Failure to Provide Public Records 
Related to COVID-19 Policies, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (May 15, 2020), 
https://www.splcenter.org/presscenter/florida-department-corrections-sued-over-failure-
provide-public-records-related-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/GRH9-LB9U] (discussing how for 
almost two months the Florida DOC failed to respond to public records requests by the 
Southern Poverty Law Center asking for information about policies to deal with the 
COVID-19 pandemic). 
 33. FOIA contains nine broad categories of government records exempt from public 
disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).  In contrast, state public disclosure laws can contain hundreds 
of enumerated exemptions which tend to sweep broadly. See, e.g., Koningisor, supra note 30, 
at 1506 (explaining how Florida’s open records law contains 1000 exemptions to public 
disclosure). 
 34. Armstrong, supra note 21, at 464. 
 35. See Michele Deitch, But Who Oversees the Overseers?:  The Status of Prison and Jail 
Oversight in the United States, 47 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207, 222–23 (2020). 
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Lastly, a lack of independent prison oversight enables prisons to generally 
operate without public scrutiny.36  Despite having one of the highest rates of 
incarceration worldwide, the United States lacks a national comprehensive 
mechanism for the routine inspection and monitoring of all confinement 
facilities.37  At the state level, nonjudicial independent oversight of 
correctional facilities has been described as “spotty and in many jurisdictions 
nonexistent.”38  While some states have implemented different types of 
independent monitoring and investigative agencies,39 they remain the 
minority. 
Thus, prison conditions lack transparency, leaving many Americans in the 
dark about the realities of prison life.40  This has enabled unspeakable abuse 
of men and women to occur behind prison walls.41  More specifically, 
extreme overcrowding, routine violence, sexual misconduct, and inadequate 
physical and mental health care consistently plague federal and state 
correctional facilities throughout the United States.42 
The COVID-19 pandemic has further exposed and exacerbated these 
existing deficiencies.  Prisons remain “cramped, unhygienic, and designed to 
inhibit a person’s ability to protect themselves.”43  Without the opportunity 
to practice social distancing or frequent handwashing in typically unsanitary 
and crowded environments,44 “inmates everywhere have been rendered 
vulnerable and often powerless to protect themselves from harm.”45  To 
minimize the spread of the virus, prison systems have placed prisoners in 
 
 36. See Armstrong, supra note 21, at 467. 
 37. See Fathi, supra note 25, at 1454 (noting that the “United States has no independent 
national agency that monitors prison conditions”). 
 38. Id. at 1460; see also Michele Deitch, Independent Correctional Oversight 
Mechanisms Across the United States:  A 50-State Inventory, 30 PACE L. REV. 1754, 1762 
(2010) (finding that formal and comprehensive external oversight among the states is “truly 
rare”). 
 39. See, e.g., Deitch, supra note 38, at 1788.  Professor Michele Deitch’s most recent 
overview in 2020 of correctional oversight mechanisms throughout the United States noted 
that in the past few years, several states have established or strengthened existing independent 
prison oversight. See Deitch, supra note 35, at 246; see, e.g., H.B. 1552, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Haw. 2019) (establishing the independent Hawaii Correctional System Oversight 
Commission); A.B. 3979, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2019) (strengthening the Office of the 
Corrections Ombudsperson, an independent office that reports directly to the governor, in New 
Jersey). 
 40. See Rovner, supra note 24, at 461; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 41. See Deitch, supra note 23, at 236 (“In such closed environments, abuse is more likely 
to occur and less likely to be discovered.”); Thompson, supra note 26. 
 42. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prisons, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
881, 887–89 (2009). 
 43. Dylan Hayre, How State Governments Across the Country Failed to Protect Our 
Communities From COVID-19, ACLU (July 2, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/criminal-
law-reform/how-state-governments-across-the-country-failed-to-protect-our-communities-
from-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/RS6N-G37F]. 
 44. See Aleks Kajstura & Jenny Landon, Since You Asked:  Is Social Distancing Possible 
Behind Bars?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Apr. 3, 2020), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/04/03/density/ [https://perma.cc/5M5X-XQ9V] 
(demonstrating that social distancing is impossible behind bars and access to necessary 
hygiene products is lacking). 
 45. Valentine v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 1598, 1601 (2020) (mem.). 
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lockdown or solitary confinement.46  As a result, prisons across the country 
have further closed their doors by suspending family visits, halting 
inspections by outside agencies, and limiting prisoners’ communications 
with the outside world.47 
Despite these efforts to contain the virus, there have been devastating 
consequences.  As of May 30, 2021, more than 390,000 people in prison have 
tested positive for COVID-19, and over 2600 inmates have died as a result.48 
B.  Federal Litigation:  Exposing and Reforming Prison Conditions 
While the aforementioned barriers have largely kept the public shielded 
from the realities of life behind bars, prisoners have taken matters into their 
own hands.  Thus, it is important to note how federal litigation has 
historically improved prison conditions, making the current conditions “less 
brutal” and inhumane than in years past.49 
Without political representation,50 prisoners have turned their attention to 
the federal courts to have their voices heard.51  However, they have not 
always been met with open arms.  Prior to the 1960s, courts took a 
“hands-off” approach to prison oversight, leaving prisoners vulnerable to the 
unchecked authority of correctional officers and staff.52  This approach was 
grounded in the notion that a prisoner, as a convicted criminal, was a “slave 
of the state” and was not entitled to any legal rights enjoyed by free citizens.53  
Federal courts further justified nonintervention with concerns over separation 
of powers and a lack of judicial expertise in handling corrections 
operations.54 
 
 46. See Joseph Shapiro, As COVID-19 Spreads in Prisons, Lockdowns Spark Fear of 
More Solitary Confinement, NPR (June 15, 2020, 4:53 PM), https://www.npr.org/ 
2020/06/15/877457603/as-covid-spreads-in-u-s-prisons-lockdowns-spark-fear-of-more-
solitary-confinemen [https://perma.cc/MQ2Y-THWS]. 
 47. See Keri Blakinger, As COVID-19 Measures Grow, Prison Oversight Falls, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 17, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/ 
2020/03/17/as-covid-19-measures-grow-prison-oversight-falls [https://perma.cc/WUW9-
LLJ7]. 
 48. See A State-by-State Look at 15 Months of Coronavirus in Prisons, supra note 5. 
 49. See Margo Schlanger, The Constitutional Law of Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103 
CORNELL L. REV. 357, 359 (2018) (“And while American jails and prisons are less brutal and 
unhealthy now than they were in the 1970s . . . current conditions behind bars are sometimes 
horrendous.”); Van Swearingen, Imprisoning Rights:  The Failure of Negotiated Governance 
in the Prison Inmate Grievance Process, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1353, 1358 (2008). 
 50. See Frank, supra note 28, at 116 (describing how prisoners have no political power to 
challenge conditions of the prison system). 
 51. See Swearingen, supra note 49, at 1358 n.32. 
 52. Hedieh Nasheri, A Spirit of Meanness:  Courts, Prisons and Prisoners, 27 CUMB. L. 
REV. 1173, 1175 (1997). 
 53. See id.; see also, e.g., Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 798 (1871) 
(finding that a prisoner is “for the time being a slave, in a condition of penal servitude to the 
State, and is subject to such laws and regulations as the State may choose to prescribe”). 
 54. Ira P. Robbins, The Cry of Wolfish in the Federal Courts:  The Future of Federal 
Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 212 
(1980). 
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Federal courts began to depart from this traditional “hands-off” policy in 
the 1960s.55  In 1961, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Monroe v. Pape,56 
which opened the door for prisoners to file civil rights lawsuits pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 198357 over prison conditions that allegedly violated their 
constitutional rights.  In 1964, the Court, in Cooper v. Pate,58 solidified a 
state prisoner’s right to bring a claim under § 1983.59 
As a result of these landmark decisions, federal litigation became an 
effective transparency mechanism to expose the realities of prison conditions 
nationwide.  A civil rights lawsuit provided the public with an unfiltered 
glimpse into the conditions of prison confinement.60  People in prison then 
had the ability to effectively force judges to face the realities of the 
“appalling” conditions of penal institutions in some states.61 
From the 1960s onward, people in state prisons increasingly utilized 
§ 1983 claims as a valuable tool to improve their prison conditions.62  Courts 
recognized a prisoner’s ability to seek relief for violations of various 
constitutional rights, including the right to be free from excessive force by 
corrections officers and the rights to adequate medical care, religious 
freedom, and due process in disciplinary proceedings.63  One of the most 
important rights recognized by the courts was a prisoner’s fundamental right 
to access the courts in the first place.64  Federal courts acknowledged that “an 
inmate’s right of unfettered access to the courts is as fundamental a right as 
any other . . . .  All other rights of an inmate are illusory without it,” as they 
 
 55. See Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time:  A Case Study of Jail and 
Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 558–59 (2006). 
 56. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 57. The section reads: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 58. 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam). 
 59. See id. at 546.  Federal prisoners have a parallel right to bring constitutional claims 
against the federal government. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390–97 (1971). 
 60. See Ken Strutin, Litigating from the Prison of the Mind:  A Cognitive Right to 
Post-Conviction Counsel, 14 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 343, 367–68 (2016). 
 61. Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the Provision of 
Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 424 (1993). 
 62. See Allen E. Honick, It’s “Exhausting”:  Reconciling a Prisoner’s Right to 
Meaningful Remedies for Constitutional Violations with the Need for Agency Autonomy, 45 
U. BALT. L. REV. 155, 160–61 (2015). 
 63. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (recognizing the right to be free from 
excessive force); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (recognizing the right to adequate 
medical care); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556–57 (1974) (recognizing the right to 
minimum due process protections in proceedings to strip prisoners’ good-time credits); Cruz 
v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (recognizing the right to religious freedom). 
 64. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977), abrogated by Lewis v. Casey, 
518 U.S. 343 (1996). 
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are “entirely dependent for their existence on the whim or caprice of the 
prison warden.”65 
In addition to recognizing a prisoner’s ability to recover for violations of 
their constitutional rights, federal courts demonstrated a willingness to take 
a step further.  In the 1970s, courts began to order long-term structural reform 
of state prison systems.66  These federal court orders ended some of the most 
cruel and inhumane practices and conditions in prisons throughout the 
country.  For example, federal court orders halted routine practices in the 
“dark and evil world” of Arkansas’s prisons,67 such as lashing prisoners for 
minor infractions with a wooden-handled, five-foot long leather strap until 
their skin was bloody;68 giving prisoners electrical shocks to sensitive parts 
of their body from a hand-cranked device known as the “Tucker 
telephone”;69 and crowding prisoners into barracks where “rape was so 
common and uncontrolled that some potential victims dared not sleep.”70  
Without the initial filing of a civil rights lawsuit, these injustices would have 
never been exposed and subsequently terminated.71 
By the early 1980s, prisons in twenty-five states were subject to 
comprehensive court orders to reform prison conditions.72  By 1995, 
forty-one states had prison orders to either reduce overcrowding or eliminate 
other unconstitutional conditions of confinement, with 37 percent of those 
states under system-wide regulation.73 
C.  The Prelude to the PLRA:  The So-Called Rise of Frivolous Prisoner 
Litigation 
In addition to the growing number of federal court orders, the number of 
prisoner civil rights filings also increased.  As the Supreme Court once 
recognized:  “What for a private citizen would be a dispute with his landlord, 
with his employer, with his tailor, with his neighbor, or with his banker 
becomes, for the prisoner, a dispute with the State.”74  Whereas the number 
of federal prisoner civil rights filings was 3620 in 1972, that number rose to 
approximately 39,000 in 1995,75 comprising 19 percent of the federal civil 
 
 65. Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 1973). 
 66. See generally Schlanger, supra note 55 (providing a detailed account of the history of 
prison court-order litigation). 
 67. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681 (1978) (quoting Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 
381 (E.D. Ark. 1970)). 
 68. See id. at 682 n.4. 
 69. See id. at 682 n.5. 
 70. Id. at 681 n.3. 
 71. See Darryl M. James, Note, Reforming Prison Litigation Reform:  Reclaiming Equal 
Access to Justice for Incarcerated Persons in America, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 465, 471 (2011) 
(“Without exposing injustice and abuse through landmark litigation like Hutto, these horrible 
conditions will not be rectified.”). 
 72. See Swearingen, supra note 49, at 1357. 
 73. See Schlanger, supra note 55, at 577. 
 74. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973). 
 75. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1583 (2003). 
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docket.76  This increase was primarily associated with a simultaneously 
growing incarcerated population in nearly every state.77 
Despite notable legal victories, such as the ones previously described, 
many prisoner civil rights lawsuits were unsuccessful.78  One explanation of 
the lack of success was that an overwhelming percentage of cases were filed 
and litigated pro se.79  Many prisoners suffer from literacy and language 
deficits, as well as mental health issues that impair their ability to draft 
well-pled complaints and advocate on their own behalf.80  Even if an inmate 
is fully capable, restricted access to libraries, legal materials, the internet, and 
telephones makes preparing a case difficult.81  Furthermore, pro se prisoners 
face an uphill battle in conducting effective discovery not only due to a lack 
of legal skills and financing to fund discovery costs but also because of 
resistance by prisons and judges to share necessary information.82  Because 
of these deficits, pro se prisoners understandably struggle to successfully 
litigate an otherwise meritorious civil rights case.83  It is thus no surprise that 
prisoner civil rights cases with attorney representation fared much better than 
cases brought pro se.84 
An alternative explanation for the high rates of dismissal, as the PLRA’s 
proponents in Congress argued,85 was that the bulk of inmate civil rights 
cases lacked sufficient merit.86  While it is true that there were many 
frivolous cases, this argument slightly mischaracterizes what was really 
taking place.87  For instance, many of the so-called frivolous cases were 
 
 76. Id. at 1558.  Although the rise of the total number of prisoners’ lawsuits was readily 
apparent, the rate at which prisoners filed civil rights lawsuits nevertheless declined between 
1980 and 1996. See Allen W. Burton, Note, Prisoners’ Suits for Money Damages:  An 
Exception to the Administrative Exhaustion Requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1359, 1368 (2001); see also Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1583. 
 77. See Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1586–87. 
 78. See id. at 1594; Burton, supra note 76, at 1367 (“According to the National 
Association of Attorneys General, more than 95% of inmate civil rights suits are dismissed in 
favor of the defendant.”). 
 79. See Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1609–10.  Inmate civil rights cases were also litigated 
pro se far more than cases involving nonprisoners. See id. at 1609; see also infra Part II.B.4.a. 
(explaining the difficulties prisoners have in obtaining counsel). 
 80. See Michael W. Martin, Foreword:  Root Causes of the Pro Se Prisoner Litigation 
Crisis, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1219, 1225–26 (2011); see also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 
496 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“In a community where illiteracy and mental deficiency 
is [sic] notoriously high, it is not enough to ask the prisoner to be his own lawyer.”). 
 81. Martin, supra note 80, at 1226. 
 82. See Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1611. 
 83. To the contrary, lawyers possess “[t]he ability to build a case, strategize in accordance 
with a case theory, avoid pleading and discovery pitfalls, [and] survive motion practice.” 
Martin, supra note 80, at 1226. 
 84. See Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1610 (noting that among cases terminated in 2000, 
“counseled cases were three times as likely as pro se cases to have recorded settlements, 
two-thirds more likely to go to trial, and two-and-a-half times as likely to end in a plaintiff’s 
victory at trial”). 
 85. See infra notes 103–09 and accompanying text. 
 86. See Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1599 (finding that the pre-PLRA data establishes that 
the inmate docket tends to have a low probability of litigated success). 
 87. See, e.g., Jon O. Newman, Opinion, No More Myths About Prisoner Lawsuits, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 3, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/01/03/opinion/l-no-more-myths-about-
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legally frivolous, not substantively so.  While an inmate may have 
experienced some legitimate form of harm, the claim was barred due to 
doctrines such as immunity.88  Nevertheless, some prisoner civil rights 
lawsuits were, in fact, substantively frivolous and garnered a significant 
amount of media attention.89  The media, with the help of the National 
Association of Attorneys General, put these so-called frivolous cases on 
public display in “Top Ten Frivolous Filings Lists,”90 which highlighted 
several notorious examples:  an inmate suing because the piece of cake on 
his dinner tray was “hacked up,” an inmate suing because corrections 
officials took away his Gameboy electronic game, or, most famously, an 
inmate suing because he was served chunky instead of smooth peanut 
butter.91 
These lists publicly portrayed inmate civil rights cases as wholly devoid 
of merit.92  But the reality appeared more complex, with some describing 
how these lists included accounts that were “at best highly misleading and, 
sometimes, simply false.”93  For example, in the chunky peanut butter case, 
the inmate was not suing merely because he received chunky instead of 
creamy peanut butter; he was actually complaining that his prison account 
had been incorrectly charged $2.50 for a jar of peanut butter he never 
received.94  As Second Circuit Judge Jon O. Newman explained, although 
$2.50 is not a large sum of money, “such a sum is not trivial to the prisoner 
whose limited prison funds are improperly debited.”95  This is just one 
example of how the dominant public narrative not only failed to acknowledge 
this more nuanced reality but also did not adequately emphasize the other 
side of the story—that there remained inmates bringing meritorious cases 
alleging serious constitutional violations.96 
 
prisoner-lawsuits-041220.html [https://perma.cc/VK9U-CAZF] (arguing that “those in 
responsible positions ought not to ridicule all prisoner lawsuits by perpetuating myths about 
them”). 
 88. See Burton, supra note 76, at 1367 n.74.  A legally frivolous complaint lacks an 
arguable basis in law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). 
 89. Burton, supra note 76, at 1367 n.74 (“While the mass media focuses on cases that are 
substantively frivolous, dismissals for legal frivolousness are far more common.”).  
Substantively frivolous claims include allegations that are “fantastic” and “delusional.” 
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 328. 
 90. See Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1568. 
 91. See 141 CONG. REC. 27,045 (1995); Jennifer A. Puplava, Note, Peanut Butter and 
Politics:  An Evaluation of the Separation-of-Powers Issues in Section 802 of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, 73 IND. L.J. 329, 330–31 (1997). 
 92. See Burton, supra note 76, at 1368. 
 93. Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation:  Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62 
BROOK. L. REV. 519, 520 (1996). 
 94. See Pfaff, supra note 12 (noting how the reality of the chunky peanut butter case was 
“far more complex” than how it was portrayed); Alysia Santo, Suing From Prison, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Feb. 18, 2015, 4:45 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/02/18/suing-
from-prison [https://perma.cc/ZHK5-JJDR]. 
 95. Newman, supra note 93, at 522. 
 96. See Burton, supra note 76, at 1368–69 (discussing how media coverage failed to 
mention legitimate inmate claims and, in doing so, distorted the public’s view). 
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II.  BROKEN PROMISES:  THE PLRA’S DETERRENCE AND OBSTRUCTION OF 
MERITORIOUS LAWSUITS 
To address the perceived problem of a burgeoning number of frivolous 
prisoner civil rights lawsuits, Congress passed the PLRA.97  The PLRA 
imposes three types of limitations on inmates challenging prison conditions 
in federal court:  “restrictions on the powers of the federal courts; restrictions 
on the relief available in prisoner cases; and restrictions on the ability of 
prisoner litigants to get into court.”98 
The PLRA seeks to reduce frivolous prisoner civil rights lawsuits through 
the following access provisions:  (1) a requirement that a prisoner exhaust 
available administrative remedies prior to bringing suit in federal court;99 (2) 
the imposition of filing fee payments for prisoners who qualify for in forma 
pauperis status;100 (3) the “three-strikes” rule that bars plaintiffs who have 
filed three civil actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or 
failing to state a cause of action;101 and (4) limitations on attorney’s fees 
awards.102 
This Note analyzes each of the PLRA’s access provisions in order to 
develop a synthesized understanding of how states can confront the PLRA’s 
negative effects.  Part II.A describes Congress’s stated purpose for the 
PLRA’s access provisions, specifically noting its intent to target only 
frivolous lawsuits.  Part II.B shows that the PLRA has not lived up to 
Congress’s stated purpose, explaining how the Act’s access provisions deter 
and obstruct meritorious prisoner civil rights lawsuits.  Part II.C then 
examines the PLRA’s overall impact. 
A.  The Stated Purpose of the PLRA’s Access Provisions 
The stated purpose of the PLRA was “to discourage frivolous and abusive 
prison lawsuits.”103  The PLRA’s limited legislative history shows that the 
Act’s proponents emphasized how the overwhelming number of frivolous 
prisoner lawsuits “tie up the courts, waste valuable legal resources, and affect 
the quality of justice enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”104  The PLRA, 
Congress believed, would help put an end to a “ridiculous waste of taxpayers’ 
 
 97. The PLRA was part of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321.  As such, its provisions are scattered throughout 
the U.S. Code. 
 98. See Elizabeth Alexander, Prison Litigation Reform Act Raises the Bar, 16 CRIM. JUST. 
10, 11 (2002).  This Note focuses on the last category of restrictions.  In addition to reducing 
frivolous lawsuits, the PLRA’s other main goal was to limit federal judicial involvement in 
the administration of state prisons. See 141 CONG. REC. 27,042 (1995) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch) (stating that “courts have gone too far in micromanaging our Nation’s prisons”). 
 99. See infra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
 100. See infra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 101. See infra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 102. See infra notes 208–13 and accompanying text. 
 103. 141 CONG. REC. 27,041 (1995).  Although not discussed in this Note, the PLRA’s 
other stated purpose was “[t]o provide for appropriate remedies for prison condition lawsuits.” 
Id. 
 104. Id. at 27,042 (statement of Sen. Dole). 
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money”105 and what it called the “inmate litigation fun-and-games.”106  To 
demonstrate these “fun-and-games,” members of Congress used anecdotes 
of fantastical cases, most notably the cases highlighted in the “Top Ten 
Frivolous Filings Lists.”107 
Congress assured that the PLRA’s target was not set on meritorious 
prisoner litigation.  For example, Senator Orrin Hatch, chair of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, emphasized that he “d[id] not want to prevent inmates 
from raising legitimate claims” and that the PLRA would not do so.108  He 
further stated that the “crushing burden of these frivolous suits makes it 
difficult for the courts to consider meritorious claims,” thus implying that if 
frivolous cases were reduced, meritorious claims could receive proper court 
attention.109 
However, then-Senator Joe Biden noticed early on that the PLRA’s ability 
to target only frivolous cases might be unrealistic.  While acknowledging the 
need to deal with an overburdened court system, largely because of the influx 
of prisoner civil rights cases, Biden worried that “in an effort to curb 
frivolous prisoner lawsuits, [the PLRA] places too many roadblocks to 
meritorious prison lawsuits.”110  Yet, despite these concerns, Congress 
passed the PLRA, and President Bill Clinton signed it into law on April 26, 
1996.111 
B.  How the PLRA Deters and Obstructs Meritorious Civil Rights Lawsuits 
Biden’s worries quickly became, and continue to be, the practical reality.  
Despite Congress’s stated intent to put an end only to frivolous inmate filings, 
the PLRA has in fact deterred and obstructed inmates’ ability to file 
meritorious civil rights lawsuits.  This part analyzes how exactly the Act does 
so, by exploring each of the PLRA’s access provisions in detail. 
1.  Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
Perhaps the most impactful access provision of the PLRA is the mandatory 
exhaustion requirement.112  Section 1997e(a) provides:  “No action shall be 
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or 
any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 
 
 105. Id. (statement of Sen. Hatch).  Senator Hatch emphasized that the “huge costs imposed 
on State governments to defend against these meritless suits is another kind of crime 
committed against law-abiding citizens.” Id. 
 106. Id. (statement of Sen. Dole). 
 107. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
 108. 141 CONG. REC. 27,042 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 27,044 (statement of Sen. Biden); Puplava, supra note 91, at 331–32. 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. 
 112. See Derek Borchardt, Note, The Iron Curtain Redrawn Between Prisoners and the 
Constitution, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 469, 470–71 (2012) (recognizing the exhaustion 
requirement as the PLRA’s largest hurdle). 
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correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted.”113 
The administrative remedies to be exhausted are not defined within the 
PLRA but are rather determined by the particular processes spelled out in a 
prison’s internal grievance procedure.114  For state prisons, state DOCs 
promulgate grievance procedures pursuant to broad legislative authority.115  
Though the process differs between states, many states’ grievance policies 
follow a similar structure.116  A typical policy requires a prisoner to complete 
multiple levels of review, beginning first with seeking a remedy through 
informal resolution and then pursuing more formal protocols if a favorable 
outcome is not attained.117  These formal protocols often have numerous 
procedural technicalities, such as using the correct form, attaching 
appropriate documentation, naming all individuals involved in an alleged 
incident, and even using the proper ink color.118  If a formal grievance results 
in denial, a prisoner must usually follow a detailed appeal process, which 
sometimes requires two levels of appeal.119  Prisoners must adhere to strict 
time requirements—typically consisting of mere days—when proceeding 
through each stage of the process.120  Only once all stages have been 
completed will an inmate be deemed to have exhausted administrative 
remedies.121  As described below, under the PLRA, prisoners must exhaust 
administrative remedies before having their cases heard on the merits, thus 
making prisons’ grievance procedures a barrier of access to the formal justice 
system. 
 
 113. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 
 114. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (“The level of detail necessary in a 
grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim 
to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of 
proper exhaustion.”).  Nearly all states have some form of a general grievance policy, which 
outlines the appropriate steps an inmate must take to air a grievance. Borchardt, supra note 
112, at 492.  For a detailed account of grievance policies from state DOCs, see generally 
PRIYAH KAUL ET AL., PRISON AND JAIL GRIEVANCE POLICIES:  LESSONS FROM A FIFTY-STATE 
SURVEY (2015), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/policyclearinghouse/ 
Site%20Documents/FOIAReport10.18.15.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/MXU5-93SP]. 
 115. See Borchardt, supra note 112, at 490–91. 
 116. Id. at 492. 
 117. Id. at 492–93. 
 118. Id. at 493. 
 119. Id. at 493–94. 
 120. Id. at 494. 
 121. Id. 
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The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement “invigorated the exhaustion 
prescription”122 by making exhaustion mandatory.123  The purpose of the 
exhaustion requirement was to “reduce the quantity and improve the quality 
of prisoner suits” by affording corrections officials with an opportunity to 
address prisoners’ complaints internally before resorting to the courts.124 
An exhaustion requirement can offer several benefits.125  For 
administrative bodies, it can preserve their autonomy and allow them to 
handle internal grievances according to their own special expertise.126  For 
courts, it can lighten caseloads by limiting the need for judicial review.127  
And even for potential plaintiffs, it may be beneficial if complaints can be 
more quickly resolved, thus making judicial involvement unnecessary.128 
However, this section demonstrates how an exhaustion requirement is 
particularly problematic when applied to prisoners’ meritorious complaints.  
This section begins by exploring courts’ strict application of the exhaustion 
requirement and then turns to a discussion of the increasing complexity of 
prison grievance procedures. 
a.  Strict Application of Exhaustion 
Courts have consistently applied a strict textual interpretation of the 
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.  Such a strict application is a product of a 
series of Supreme Court cases in which the Court intensified the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement as a significant procedural hurdle for inmates to 
overcome.129  As the decisions demonstrate, mandatory exhaustion applies 
regardless of a lawsuit’s merit, with only one narrow textual exception.130  
The practical effect is that courts must dismiss a prisoner’s case without 
considering the claim’s merits if the prisoner-plaintiff has not previously 
completed all requisite stages of a prison’s internal grievance process. 
 
 122. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002).  The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement 
amended the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA). Pub. L. No. 96–247, 94 
Stat. 349, 352 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e).  CRIPA required a prisoner 
to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit regarding prison conditions only if 
the particular prison’s internal grievance process had been certified by the attorney general as 
“plain, speedy, and effective.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524; Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1627.  See 
generally Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Enigmatic Exhaustion 
Requirement:  What It Means and What Congress, Courts and Correctional Officials Can 
Learn from It, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 483, 493–96 (2001) (detailing CRIPA’s framework).  
Moreover, courts could use discretion and decide if requiring exhaustion was ultimately 
“appropriate and in the interests of justice.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 523 (quoting 
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)–(b)). 
 123. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 524. 
 124. Id. at 524–25. 
 125. See Burton, supra note 76, at 1372–74 (describing the benefits of the exhaustion 
requirement in general). 
 126. See id. at 1372–73. 
 127. See id. at 1373. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See infra notes 131–48 and accompanying text. 
 130. See infra notes 131–48 and accompanying text. 
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In Booth v. Churner131 and Porter v. Nussle,132 the Supreme Court 
clarified the applicability of PLRA exhaustion to specific types of claims.  In 
Booth, the Court held that a prisoner who alleged that corrections officers 
assaulted him and denied him medical attention to treat his resulting injuries 
was still required to exhaust administrative remedies despite the 
impossibility of receiving requested monetary compensation through the 
prison’s grievance process.133  When addressing the inability of the grievance 
system to provide the requested relief, the Court emphasized that it would 
“not read futility or other exceptions into [the PLRA’s] exhaustion 
requirement[].”134  As a result, the Court affirmed the dismissal of Booth’s 
otherwise meritorious claim based on his failure to exhaust the prison’s 
grievance process.135 
In Porter, the Court held that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies 
to individual instances of excessive force.136  In doing so, the Court clarified 
that the exhaustion requirement “applies to all prisoners seeking redress for 
prison circumstances or occurrences.”137  Thus, the Court rejected an 
interpretation of the exhaustion provision that would create an exception for 
excessive force claims, rationalizing that Congress did not intend to divide 
inmates’ claims into two discrete subcategories.138 
While Booth and Porter clarified the applicability of PLRA exhaustion to 
different types of claims, the Court’s 2006 decision in Woodford v. Ngo139 
dictated the precise manner in which exhaustion itself must be achieved.  In 
Woodford, the Court held that “proper exhaustion of administrative remedies 
is necessary,” meaning that an inmate must strictly meet all institutional 
deadlines and procedures of a prison’s internal grievance procedure prior to 
filing a civil action regarding prison conditions in federal court.140  In setting 
“proper exhaustion” as the standard for satisfying PLRA exhaustion, the 
Woodford majority was relatively unsympathetic to the fact that such a 
standard could be “harsh for prisoners, who generally are untrained in the 
law and are often poorly educated.”141  The Court also rejected the argument 
that the “proper exhaustion” doctrine would “lead prison administrators to 
devise procedural requirements that are designed to trap unwary prisoners” 
and purposely defeat their claims.142  Ultimately, as a result of Woodford, 
 
 131. 532 U.S. 731 (2001). 
 132. 534 U.S. 516 (2002). 
 133. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 (holding that Congress mandates exhaustion regardless of 
relief sought). 
 134. Id. at 741 n.6. 
 135. Id. at 741. 
 136. See Porter, 534 U.S. at 520. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 526–27. 
 139. 548 U.S. 81 (2006). 
 140. Id. at 84; see also Meredith Sterritt, Note, The Prison Litigation Reform Act & Ross 
v. Blake:  Why the Constitution Requires Amending the Exhaustion Requirement to Protect 
Inmates’ Access to Federal Court, 53 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 115, 122 (2020). 
 141. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 103. 
 142. Id. at 102. 
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even the most minor departure from a procedural requirement in a prison 
grievance system can serve as the basis for dismissing a prisoner-plaintiff’s 
claim before examining the merits.143 
In 2016, the Court considered whether special circumstances can excuse 
an inmate’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  In Ross v. Blake,144 
the Court rejected a special circumstances exception to the PLRA’s 
exhaustion provision,145 while simultaneously identifying a textual exception 
requiring an inmate to exhaust only administrative remedies that are 
“available.”146  It emphasized that a grievance process would be practically 
unavailable:  (1) where it “operates as a simple dead end—with officers 
unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates”; 
(2) where it is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of 
use”; or (3) where prison administrators prevent access to it “through 
machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.”147  The Court, however, 
left lower courts to engage in fact-specific inquiries over whether 
administrative remedies were “available” in certain instances.148 
Most recently, however, the Court revisited the issue of PLRA exhaustion 
in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.  Despite affirming the denial of 
an application to vacate a stay on an injunction requiring a state geriatric 
prison to follow an extensive protocol to prevent the spread of the 
coronavirus, Justice Sotomayor explained that “if a plaintiff has established 
that the prison grievance procedures at issue are utterly incapable of 
responding to a rapidly spreading pandemic like Covid-19, the procedures 
may be ‘unavailable’ to meet the plaintiff’s purposes.”149  She reasoned that, 
in “unprecedented circumstances,” the PLRA’s textual exception of 
“availability” formally introduced in Ross v. Blake could “open the 
courthouse doors where they would otherwise stay closed.”150 
Despite Justice Sotomayor’s implicit signal to lower courts to utilize the 
exhaustion requirement’s lone textual exception for claims arising during and 
related to the pandemic, some courts have still refused to find that a prison’s 
 
 143. As a procedural matter, an inmate’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies under 
the PLRA is an affirmative defense and inmates are not required to specially plead or 
demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007).  
However, some federal district courts have inmates file pro forma complaints that include 
questions asking if they have exhausted their administrative remedies, thus requiring them to 
allege exhaustion in many instances. See Broc Gullett, Comment, Eliminating Standard 
Pleading Forms That Require Prisoners to Allege Their Exhaustion of Administrative 
Remedies, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1179, 1199. 
 144. 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016). 
 145. Id. at 1858. 
 146. See id. (explaining the textual exception to the PLRA’s mandatory exhaustion 
provision).  As used in the PLRA, “available” means capable of use to obtain some relief for 
the action complained of. See id. at 1859 (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738 
(2001)). 
 147. Id. at 1859–60. 
 148. See id. at 1859. 
 149. Valentine v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 1598, 1600–01 (2020) (mem.). 
 150. Id. at 1601. 
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grievance process is unavailable.151  For example, the Fifth Circuit bluntly 
concluded that “under Ross, special circumstances—even threats posed by 
global pandemics—do not matter” for the purpose of PLRA exhaustion.152  
In holding that two geriatric inmates had failed to exhaust their prison’s 
grievance system prior to bringing suit, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that 
“inadequate is not a synonym for unavailable.”153  Despite acknowledging 
that the prison’s grievance process was “suboptimal,” in that it was “lengthy 
and unlikely to provide necessary COVID-19 relief,” the Fifth Circuit 
nevertheless found the process to be “available.”154 
In the midst of a pandemic posing unique dangers to people in prison,155 
courts have continued to strictly interpret the PLRA’s exhaustion 
requirement which, by its unambiguous terms, “prevent[s] a court from 
deciding that exhaustion would be unjust or inappropriate in a given case.”156  
Thus, all inmates—regardless of the merits of their claims or the 
unprecedented circumstances in which they find themselves—are required to 
exhaust all available remedies before accessing the court system. 
b.  Navigating Increasingly Complex Grievance Procedures 
Strict application of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement and the 
court-made doctrine of “proper exhaustion” makes grievance procedures a 
critical element in the protection of prisoners’ constitutional rights.157  
However, successfully completing all stages of a prison’s grievance process 
may prove difficult for many inmates.  Without an attorney, many inmates158 
often struggle to master the intricate details of a grievance procedure.159  The 
practical administration of a typical grievance system also poses serious 
challenges.160  In states where a grievance procedure is not subject to 
notice-and-comment rulemaking, a prisoner is required to “complain[] about 
the actions of prison staff to prison staff using rules administered and often 
written by prison staff and corrections officials.”161  Accordingly, corrections 
staff have an interest in making it hard for prisoners to successfully exhaust 
 
 151. See generally, e.g., Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 2020); Nellson v. 
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 152. Valentine, 978 F.3d at 161. 
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 155. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text. 
 156. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016). 
 157. Borchardt, supra note 112, at 490. 
 158. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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counsel, because they are frequently unable to navigate cumbersome and confusing grievance 
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administrative remedies, as the ability to properly exhaust directly impacts 
the viability of a future lawsuit that could hold those same individuals 
liable.162 
Moreover, inmates’ fear of retaliation can deter them from participating in 
the grievance process altogether, despite having a potentially meritorious 
complaint.163  As the typical first step of a prison grievance procedure is to 
seek an informal resolution by confronting the officer or staff member 
involved, the system can naturally facilitate these fears.164  According to 
Professor James E. Robertson, retaliation against inmates is an unfortunate 
norm.165  Studies have shown that large percentages of people in prison have 
experienced retaliation as a result of submitting a grievance.166  Thus, despite 
having legitimate complaints regarding their conditions of confinement, 
many inmates may choose to not file grievances at all.167  Because of PLRA 
exhaustion, these inmates who abstain from filing grievances may ultimately 
sacrifice the ability to bring their underlying complaint to federal court, 
meaning that their experiences will remain behind bars.168 
In addition to these difficulties, there is also evidence that some states have 
reconfigured their grievance processes to have “increasingly onerous, rigid 
requirements, or otherwise maintain[ed] grievance systems designed to foil 
prisoners’ lawsuits.”169  For example, one study found the evolution of 
Arkansas’s grievance procedure to exhibit a troubling pattern.  From 1997 to 
2011, the difficulty of the Arkansas DOC’s grievance procedure was 
“incrementally raised, and revisions were added to specifically target and 
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 163. See James E. Robertson, “One of the Dirty Secrets of American Corrections”:  
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(2009). 
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 165. Robertson, supra note 163, at 613. 
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 167. See Robertson, supra note 163, at 614 (summarizing a study finding that 60 percent 
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grievances despite having legitimate complaints, in part, because of the fear of retaliation). 
 168. See id. 
 169. Borchardt, supra note 112, at 472.  Providing a detailed account of the myriad of ways 
in which some states have changed their grievance procedures is outside the scope of this 
Note.  This Note makes the general point that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement has 
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to their grievance procedures, see id. at 490–519; see also Mikkor, supra note 161, at 583 
(describing how several state corrections agencies made changes to their internal grievance 
procedures after the PLRA’s enactment). 
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defeat arguments that prisoners had previously used to convince courts that 
they adequately exhausted the available procedures.”170  In addition to 
imposing shorter time limits to appeal a grievance decision,171 revisions 
included a requirement that an inmate exhaust remedies through the 
grievance process in instances where officers have retaliated against the same 
inmate for filing a grievance in the first place,172 as well as a strict 
requirement to identify all relevant personnel on a grievance form.173 
Under the proper exhaustion standard set out in Woodford, elaborate 
grievance procedures, such as the one described, become traps for the 
unwary.174  Since Woodford, thousands of prisoner civil rights cases have 
been dismissed for failure to properly exhaust administrative remedies, 
without regard for the merits of the claims.175  In a report criticizing the 
PLRA and calling for amendment to the Act, Human Rights Watch illustrated 
how district courts have frequently dismissed cases because inmates have 
made technical errors, used the wrong form, or wrote to the wrong entity 
within the prison system, thus not properly following a prison’s internal 
grievance process.176  Even when there is good cause for an inmate’s failure 
to comply with a prison’s grievance system—such as dyslexia, illiteracy, 
mental illness, brain injury and memory loss, blindness, or being in a coma—
courts have continued to enforce the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.177  
This has even continued during the COVID-19 pandemic,178 making clear 
that courts are not departing from a strictly textual interpretation of the 
exhaustion requirement, even when faced with otherwise meritorious civil 
rights claims.  In this way, the exhaustion requirement obstructs meritorious 
civil rights lawsuits. 
2.  The Filing Fee Provision 
The PLRA’s filing fee provision requires all inmate litigants challenging 
the conditions of their confinement to pay court filing fees in full.179  When 
describing its rationale for the filing fee requirement, Congress stated that all 
 
 170. Borchardt, supra note 112, at 502. 
 171. See id. at 506. 
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 173. See id. at 505 (quoting the Dep’t of Corr., State of Ark., Administrative Directive 
07-03 § IV.C.4 (2007)). 
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it was doing was “asking [inmates to] pay the same kind of filing fees and 
costs” as all other citizens bringing lawsuits.180 
Although perhaps an appropriate measure181—both to ensure proper 
funding of the court system and to create a financial disincentive for 
would-be inmate litigants filing frivolous complaints—the filing fee 
provision imposes a considerable financial burden on inmate litigants, who 
overwhelmingly proceed as indigent plaintiffs.182 
Generally, indigent plaintiffs who cannot afford to pay court filing fees 
and costs may request in forma pauperis status and ask a court to waive the 
requisite fees.183  Prior to the PLRA, the same was true for indigent inmate 
litigants.184  But pursuant to the PLRA, inmates can no longer have fees 
waived.185  If an inmate qualifies as in forma pauperis,186 the full filing fee 
still must be paid, but the payment can be completed in installments.187 
Denying indigent inmate litigants the ability to waive court filing fees can 
deter them from filing meritorious claims.  For example, the current amount 
for an initial filing fee in federal court is $350.188  This can amount to 
“months, if not years, of prison wages.”189  While there may be less of a need 
for an income in prison, the money an inmate earns or receives from the state 
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instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in such court . . . to pay a filing fee of 
$350 . . . .”). 
 189. Brief Amici Curiae of Thirty-Three Professors in Support of Petitioner, Coleman v. 
Tollefson at 19, 135 S. Ct. 1759 (2015) (No. 13-1333), 2014 WL 7205509, at *19.  The 
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is often used to satisfy fees and inflated commissary costs of items, such as 
extra food, hygiene supplies, postage and writing supplies, phone calls, and 
other essential goods and services.190  Per the PLRA, “[n]o matter how poor 
an inmate is, or how essential the items she must buy from the commissary 
with her meager funds, monthly payments of 20 percent of her inmate 
account must be handed over until the court fees are paid in full.”191  The 
PLRA’s filing fee thus pushes indigent inmates to weigh their options:  
pursuing a civil rights claim—likely lessening the ability to purchase goods 
and services from the commissary—or abstaining from filing a civil rights 
complaint to have fewer struggles in prison.192  Therefore, even when cases 
may be high in merit, the filing fee requirement discourages prisoners from 
filing a civil rights lawsuit in the first place. 
3.  The “Three-Strikes” Rule 
The PLRA removes the ability to pay filing fees through monthly 
installments for those deemed to be frequent filers through the “three-strikes” 
rule.  The three-strikes rule prohibits people in prison from filing in forma 
pauperis if: 
the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or 
detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United 
States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or 
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner 
is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.193 
Accordingly, a prisoner who has received three strikes must almost always 
pay the entire court filing fee up front before proceeding.194  If a court 
determines that a prisoner-plaintiff has three strikes, it can allow thirty days 
for the full filing fee to be paid.  If this is not done, the action will be 
dismissed.195  Barring a prisoner from proceeding in forma pauperis is the 
practical equivalent of barring a prisoner from court altogether.196  Most 
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importantly, the three-strikes rule—just like the exhaustion and filing fee 
provisions—applies equally to frivolous and meritorious claims. 
Nevertheless, courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of the 
PLRA’s “three-strikes” rule.197  Courts have rejected equal protection 
challenges, asserting that the rule is rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest in “relieving the pressure of excessive prisoner filings” 
on federal courts by introducing economic disincentives to filing frivolous 
lawsuits.198  Moreover, in holding that the rule does not violate an inmate’s 
right to access to the courts, the Second Circuit explained that the provision 
affects merely an inmate’s “ability to proceed in forma pauperis after 
repeated filings reaching a level that Congress has deemed abusive” and does 
not prevent inmates from filing civil actions altogether.199 
However, in reality, the three-strikes rule has not been limited to instances 
of abusive, repeated frivolous filings.200  The statute does not define the terms 
“frivolous,” “malicious,” or “fails to state a claim,” thus leaving courts to 
evaluate whether to count a prior dismissal of an inmate’s lawsuit as a 
strike.201  However, in a concise opinion, the Supreme Court recently held 
that a dismissal for failure to state a claim counts as a strike, whether or not 
it was with prejudice.202  Treating a dismissal for failure to state a claim as a 
strike can serve to effectively punish a pro se inmate litigant for an 
understandable inability to artfully draft a complaint sufficient to survive 
heightened federal pleading standards.203  Regardless of whether prior 
dismissals were based on insufficiencies in pleading, procedural mistakes, or 
even frivolous claims, once an inmate has accumulated three strikes, the 
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statute is strictly applied, thus preventing the filing of even meritorious 
claims unless a prisoner can pay a relatively significant sum of money.204 
Because the three-strikes rule has no time limit, if a prisoner obtains three 
strikes early in a sentence or over a short span of time, a prisoner will be 
forever barred from seeking federal court relief for any nonphysical harm, 
unless the prisoner has sufficient funds to pay a $350 filing fee and related 
costs.205  In a dissenting opinion, a Third Circuit judge acknowledged that 
some prisoners “whose ‘strikes’ were racked up without any bad faith or 
abuse” subsequently face § 1915(g)’s bar of even “potentially meritorious 
litigation at the filing stage, with no opportunity for substantive review or 
appeal.”206  Despite PLRA proponents’ promise that the Act would not 
prevent the filing of meritorious suits, the three-strikes rule continues to 
break this promise. 
4.  Limitations on Attorney’s Fees 
The PLRA’s provisions limiting attorney’s fee awards specifically target 
only successful, meritorious cases.207  The PLRA limits the scope and 
amount of attorneys’ compensation for prisoners’ civil rights claims that 
would otherwise be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.208  The limitations 
function in the following ways.209  Attorney’s fees cannot be an hourly rate 
greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under the Criminal 
Justice Act of 1964210 for payment of court-appointed costs.211  In addition, 
in damages cases, attorney’s fees cannot be greater than 150 percent of the 
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plaintiff’s monetary recovery.212  Courts are also instructed to require a 
portion of an inmate plaintiff’s money judgment, not exceeding 25 percent, 
to be deducted to satisfy an attorney’s fee award.213 
This section explains how these limitations exacerbate the preexisting 
difficulties for inmates in obtaining legal counsel and emphasizes how the 
PLRA’s limitations on attorney’s fees further diminish an inmate’s chances 
of succeeding on a meritorious claim. 
a.  The Difficulties in Obtaining Counsel 
Even before the PLRA, inmates have always had considerable difficulty 
obtaining counsel in civil rights cases.214  While there is a constitutional right 
to counsel for defendants in criminal cases,215 there is no such parallel right 
in civil cases.216  Nor is there typically a statutory right to counsel.217  If an 
inmate attempts to seek counsel prior to filing a lawsuit, finding private 
attorneys willing to provide legal services in a prisoner’s civil rights case is 
rather difficult.218  First, prisoners have no suitable way of identifying and 
connecting with the small percentage of lawyers who are actually willing to 
take on their cases before a complaint is filed.219  Second, because prisons 
are often located in remote, rural areas, attorneys may be unwilling to make 
a “300 mile trip” to participate in client interviews and provide in-person 
counseling.220  Lastly, both the “deep-seated societal antipathy towards 
prisoners as a class as well as the absence of lost wages or future earnings 
damages ensures that damages in prisoner cases will nearly always be 
minimal.”221  The high costs of conducting effective discovery and retaining 
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expert assistance can exceed expected damages,222 making litigating a 
prisoner’s civil rights case not economically feasible.  Thus, even if more 
attorneys were willing to provide representation for prisoners in civil rights 
case, they may be unable to do so. 
Nonetheless, there remains a handful of legal services organizations that 
aid prisoners in civil rights cases pro bono.223  Nonprofit organizations that 
litigate prisoners’ civil rights lawsuits include the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU)224—at both national and state levels—as well as different 
state organizations, such as Prisoners’ Legal Services of New York (PLS).225  
While national organizations tend to take on large class actions or impact 
litigation,226 regional, state, and local organizations tend to focus on 
representing individual inmates.227  However, the decision to assist with any 
particular case “depends on the issue or problem presented, the chance of 
success, the amount of time and resources necessary to properly assist, the 
office’s resources, staff availability and caseload.”228  As such, legal aid 
organizations can only offer a limited amount of representation.229  While all 
of these organizations can aid in some cases, there remains a large gap in 
representation, as demand typically overwhelms the supply of available pro 
bono assistance.230 
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programs providing legal representation to prison inmates in individual cases). 
 228. Legal Resources for People in Prison in New York, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/resources/legal/NY/ [https://perma.cc/2S4Q-MW9U] (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2021). 
 229. In 2018, Prisoner Legal Services of New York received over 10,000 requests for 
assistance from incarcerated New Yorkers but, due to limited resources, was only able to 
accept and investigate approximately 2000, or 20 percent, of those requests. KAREN L. 
MURTAGH & THOMAS J. CURRAN, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE HEARINGS ON 
THE NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC PROTECTION BUDGET FOR FY2019–2020 CONDUCTED BY THE 
ASSEMBLY WAYS AND MEANS AND SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEES 3 (2019), 
https://www.nysenate.gov/sites/default/files/testimony_given_by_the_prisoners_legal_servic
es_pls.pdf [https://perma.cc/FP6L-JFUD]. 
 230. See Hill, supra note 184, at 226. 
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Therefore, in the vast majority of situations, a prisoner has no choice but 
to proceed pro se.231  Only after a complaint is drafted and the case is filed 
may an indigent inmate litigant move to appoint counsel under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(1).232  Typically, district courts appoint counsel only in 
exceptional cases where the claims have sufficient merit or involve complex 
or novel legal questions and where the indigent litigant cannot adequately 
present his case and has made unsuccessful efforts to obtain a lawyer.233  
Court appointment is typically the primary means of involving private law 
firms who volunteer to take on pro bono matters in prisoners’ civil rights 
cases.234 
However, because the motion to appoint counsel occurs after an inmate 
plaintiff is supposed to have exhausted administrative remedies and drafted 
a complaint, the motion is considered moot if a court finds that an inmate has 
failed to satisfy any one of the PLRA’s procedural requirements or that the 
complaint fails to state a claim.235  Thus, the decision to appoint counsel 
occurs after an inmate would have already made errors resulting in 
dismissal—errors that could have possibly been avoided if that inmate had 
attorney representation from the initial filing of an internal grievance in 
prison.236 
Even once a court decides counsel is appropriate in a given case, it can 
often do no more than merely request such representation.237  Thus, an 
attorney must voluntarily accept a court appointment for a prisoner’s case 
free of charge.238 
 
 231. See Tiffany Buxton, Note, Foreign Solutions to the U.S. Pro Se Phenomenon, 34 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 103, 105 (2002) (explaining, with respect to the general population, that 
“[t]he prohibitive cost of obtaining counsel remains the primary reason for the increased 
number of litigants appearing pro se”); see also Free v. United States, 879 F.2d 1535, 1539 
(7th Cir. 1989) (Coffey, J., concurring) (“[T]he vast majority of prisoners are indigent, 
necessitating the filing of their complaints in forma pauperis . . . .”). 
 232. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (providing that a court “may request an attorney to 
represent any person unable to afford counsel”). 
 233. See generally John R. FitzGerald, Note, Non-Merit-Based Tests Have No Merit:  
Restoring District Court Discretion Under § 1915(E)(1), 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2169 
(2018) (highlighting a circuit split in which the majority of circuits allow district judges to 
consider the case’s merits before appointing counsel under § 1915(e)(1)). 
 234. See Sturm, supra note 226, at 105. 
 235. See, e.g., Gaither v. Deal, CV 120-094, 2020 WL 5736612, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 
2020) (denying indigent inmate’s motions for appointment of counsel as moot because the 
inmate had at least three strikes and did not qualify for the imminent danger exception under 
the PLRA). 
 236. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 184, at 194 n.108 (explaining how the Central District of 
California appoints counsel only if the case has survived dismissal and summary judgment, 
unless an inmate has severe mental or language-related challenges). 
 237. See Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1612 (noting that counsel appointments have been 
quite rare since courts can neither compel attorneys to serve as counsel nor compensate them 
for their service).  But see Schnorrenberg, supra note 218, at 265 (highlighting how the Fifth 
Circuit became the first circuit to find that courts can compel representation via inherent 
authority). 
 238. See Hill, supra note 184, at 195. 
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b.  A Chilling Effect:  Attorney’s Fee Limitations Discourage 
Representation 
The PLRA’s attorney’s fee limitations exacerbate these existing 
difficulties in obtaining counsel and discourage attorney representation in 
prisoner civil rights cases, particularly cases with merit.  Despite expressing 
concerns about how the PLRA’s limitations on attorney’s fees may 
disincentivize attorneys from representing prisoners in civil rights cases, 
courts have rejected constitutional challenges.239  For example, in Walker v. 
Bain,240 the Sixth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the PLRA’s attorney 
fee caps241 despite noting that § 1997e(d)(2) “will have a strong chilling 
effect upon counsels’ willingness to represent prisoners who have 
meritorious claims” and admitting “to being troubled by a federal statute that 
seeks to reduce the number of meritorious civil rights claims and protect the 
public fisc at the expense of denying a politically unpopular group their 
ability to vindicate actual . . . civil rights violations.”242 
This “chilling effect” is best illustrated in how courts have applied the fee 
limitations in cases where a prisoner-plaintiff is awarded minimal or nominal 
damages.243  Courts have repeatedly rejected an exception to § 1997e(d)(2) 
for minimal or nominal monetary judgments.244  Thus, lawyers who 
represent prisoners in civil rights cases resulting in low damage awards are 
sometimes left with a fee award of just $1.50 for years of work.245  The 
Second Circuit acknowledged that capping attorney’s fees for a $1.00 
monetary judgment at $1.50 is the “practical equivalent of no fee award at 
all.”246  Consequently, private attorneys have even less of an incentive to take 
on prisoner’s rights cases than they had before.247 
 
 239. See, e.g., Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 669 (6th Cir. 2001) (“§ 1997e(d)(2) is 
rationally related to serving the purposes of decreasing marginal prisoner lawsuits and 
protecting the public fisc.”); Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 46 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that 
§ 1997e(d)(2) does not offend the Fifth Amendment); Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 996 
(9th Cir. 1999). 
 240. 257 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 241. Id. at 670 (holding that § 1997e(d)(2) survived rational basis review). 
 242. Id. 
 243. It is common for money damages in successful inmate civil rights cases finding 
constitutional violations to be of low or nominal value, unless violations are accompanied by 
serious bodily harm or dehumanizing treatment. See Robert L. Tsai, Conceptualizing 
Constitutional Litigation as Anti-Government Expression:  A Speech-Centered Theory of 
Court Access, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 835, 895 (2002). 
 244. See, e.g., Shepherd v. Goord, 662 F.3d 603, 609 (2d Cir. 2011); Keup v. Hopkins, 596 
F.3d 899, 905–06 (8th Cir. 2010); Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 742 (7th Cir. 2006); 
Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006); Boivin, 225 F.3d at 40. 
 245. See supra note 244; see also Umphres, supra note 208, at 271. 
 246. Shepherd, 662 F.3d at 609. 
 247. See Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 369 n.2 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“An attorney’s decision to invest time and energy in a civil rights suit 
necessarily involves a complex balance of factors, including the likelihood of success, the 
amount of labor necessary to prosecute the case to completion, and the potential recovery.”); 
Tsai, supra note 243, at 895 (explaining how the PLRA’s attorney’s fee caps further 
disincentivize lawyers from representing inmates). 
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This added disincentive negatively affects not the frivolous cases that 
Congress intended to target but the meritorious lawsuits that it claimed would 
not be disturbed.248  As a result, the PLRA’s attorney’s fee limitations further 
complicate the ability of an inmate to adequately present a meritorious claim 
to the court, as cases with attorney representation are much more successful 
than those without.249 
C.  The Post-PLRA Aftermath 
Overall, the PLRA’s impact on individual inmate cases was immediate and 
profound, particularly with respect to the number of new civil rights 
complaints filed in federal court.  In the first five years following the PLRA’s 
enactment, there was a 43 percent decline in new federal filings despite a 
simultaneous 23 percent increase in the incarcerated population.250  By 2006, 
the number of inmate filings per 1000 inmates had decreased by 60 percent 
since 1995.251  Filing rates then stabilized between 2007 and 2018.252 
It is difficult to know for certain whether the sharp decline in new federal 
filings reflected a decline in frivolous or meritorious lawsuits.253  According 
to Professors Margo Schlanger and Giovanna Shay, these trends suggest that 
the PLRA has fulfilled its stated purpose of lightening the burdens imposed 
on state governments and courts by frivolous prisoner litigation.254  But 
meritorious lawsuits have become collateral damage, suggesting that the 
decline in filings reflects, at least in part, a decline in filings that may have 
otherwise had some merit. 
If the PLRA only targeted frivolous lawsuits, thus allowing for meritorious 
claims to shine through, one would expect to see prisoner-plaintiffs 
succeeding in more lawsuits than before.255  Yet, as fewer inmates are 
 
 248. See Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 601 (7th Cir. 2003) (Rovner, J., dissenting) 
(predicting that the only impact the PLRA’s attorney’s fee provisions will have is on the 
meritorious prisoner actions). 
 249. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 250. Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1559–60. 
 251. Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails 
and Prisons:  The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 139, 141–42 (2008). 
 252. Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153, 156 (2015).  Recently updated data shows how filing rates have 
slightly increased between 2012 and 2018, with a slight uptick of approximately 2 percent. 
Data Update:  Table A:  Incarcerated Population and Prison/Jail Civil Rights/Conditions 
Filings, FY 1970–FY 2020, INCARCERATION & THE L., https://incarcerationlaw.com/ 
resources/data-update/#TableA [https://perma.cc/4NUQ-BFYQ] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021); 
see also Andrea Fenster & Margo Schlanger, Slamming the Courthouse Door:  25 Years of 
Evidence for Repealing the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Apr. 26, 
2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/PLRA_25.html [https://perma.cc/RQ7B-XRFE]. 
 253. See Brian J. Ostrom et al., Congress, Courts and Corrections:  An Empirical 
Perspective on the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1525, 1544 (2003) 
(“The precise nature of the cases not filed because of the PLRA’s provisions (meritorious vs. 
nonmeritorious) is unknowable.”). 
 254. See Schlanger & Shay, supra note 251, at 141. 
 255. Id. at 142; see also 141 CONG. REC. 27,042 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“The 
crushing burden of these frivolous suits makes it difficult for the courts to consider meritorious 
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accessing the courts, even more cases are dismissed pretrial.256  Not only are 
more cases dismissed, but they are dismissed at a faster rate than nonprisoner 
civil rights cases.257 
In addition to the decline in filings and increase in dismissal rates, there 
was also a noticeable increase in the percentage of inmate civil rights cases 
no longer represented by counsel.  This suggests that the PLRA’s attorney’s 
fee limitations had the chilling effect previously described.  In 1996, prisoner 
civil rights cases proceeded without counsel 83.3 percent of the time.258  By 
2000, that number jumped to 95.6 percent and remained relatively high, 
staying at 92.4 percent in 2020.259 
While the PLRA governs prisoners’ lawsuits challenging prison conditions 
in federal court, state prisoners theoretically have the option of bringing state 
claims in state court.260  However, after the PLRA’s passage, many state 
legislatures enacted analogous statutes restricting inmate access to state 
court261 if they had not done so already.262  Thus, at both the federal and state 
levels, courthouse doors remain largely closed to people in prison. 
These post-PLRA trends indicate that the PLRA has disrupted the ability 
of litigation to serve its traditional role as a viable transparency mechanism 
for the prison population.263  In deterring and obstructing the filing of 
meritorious prisoner civil rights claims, the PLRA has constructed yet 
another barrier between prisons and the public264—one that does not appear 
ready to break down anytime soon. 
 
claims.”); 141 CONG. REC. 38,276 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“If we achieve a 50-percent 
reduction in bogus Federal prisoner claims, we will free up judicial resources for claims with 
merit by . . . prisoners . . . .”). 
 256. See Hill, supra note 184, at 208. 
 257. See Schlanger, supra note 252, at 166, 166 tbl. 5. 
 258. Id. at 167 tbl. 6. 
 259. Data Update:  Table B:  Pro Se Litigation in U.S. District Courts, by Case Type, 
INCARCERATION & THE L., https://incarcerationlaw.com/resources/data-update/#TableB 
[https://perma.cc/RM8Y-E343] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021). 
 260. See Alison Brill, Note, Rights Without Remedy:  The Myth of State Court Accessibility 
After the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 645, 676 (2008). 
 261. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 42-12-1 to 42-12-9 (West 2021); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 15:1181–90 (West 2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5501–600.5531 (West 2020); 
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6601–08 (West 2021); see also Lynn S. Branham, Of Mice and 
Prisoners:  The Constitutionality of Extending Prisoners’ Confinement for Filing Frivolous 
Lawsuits, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1029 (2002) (“The PLRA catalyzed the enactment of state 
statutes designed to further curb prisoners filing frivolous lawsuits.”). 
 262. See Brill, supra note 260, at 676–77; Schlanger, supra note 75, at 1635 n.272 (listing 
state statutes specifically regulating inmate access to state court).  Similar to the federal 
counterpart, these state versions typically “require inmates to exhaust administrative remedies, 
pay mandatory filing fees, impose penalties for frivolous suits, and limit the terms of 
prospective relief.” Brill, supra note 260, at 676–77. 
 263. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text; see also Stan Stojkovic, Prison 
Oversight and Prison Leadership, 30 PACE L. REV. 1476, 1482 (2010) (contending that the 
PLRA’s ultimate impact is that “prisons have become less transparent”). 
 264. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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III.  COLLATERALLY ATTACKING THE PLRA’S APPLICATION TO 
MERITORIOUS CIVIL LAWSUITS 
The PLRA continues to deter and obstruct the filing of meritorious 
prisoner civil lawsuits, thus sharply limiting litigation as one of the only 
effective transparency mechanisms for people in America’s prisons.  While 
many have urged for the Act’s amendment or repeal, those efforts have yet 
to come to fruition, at least with respect to the access provisions.265  
Moreover, there is no indication that courts will depart from a strictly textual 
reading of the statute,266 absent Congressional action, which also appears 
unlikely.  Little scholarship has addressed how to counteract the harmful 
effects that the PLRA’s access provisions have caused, while still preserving 
litigation as a crucial transparency mechanism—short of the Act’s 
amendment, repeal, or judicial reinterpretation.267  This Note therefore aims 
to fill that gap. 
Given the reality that the PLRA is likely to remain intact, Part III.A argues 
that there is a need to combat the PLRA’s application to meritorious prisoner 
civil rights lawsuits.  Part III.B proposes that states adopt a two-step 
framework that can pave the way for more meritorious claims to make it to 
court with greater chances of success. 
A.  The Need to Combat the PLRA’s Application to Meritorious Lawsuits 
There is a critical need for states to take proactive steps to counteract the 
PLRA’s negative effects on meritorious prisoner civil rights cases.  As a 
general matter, transparency remains one of the key features of a properly 
functioning democratic society.  Without transparency, people in prison, the 
public, and even correctional staff suffer the consequences.  First, without 
unfettered access to the courts, people in prison typically have no other 
effective means to voice legitimate complaints about prison conditions to the 
external world, leaving them vulnerable to mistreatment and abuse.268  The 
PLRA thus tampers with one of the most fundamental rights belonging to 
people in prison.269 
Second, while macro-level judicial oversight and large-scale prison reform 
are undoubtedly crucial,270 the role of individual inmate lawsuits must not be 
overlooked.  Individual inmate lawsuits can often be reflective of larger 
existing issues that affect all inmates, such as overcrowding, inadequate 
 
 265. See, e.g., Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2009, H.R. 4335, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 266. See, e.g., supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text. 
 267. See Deitch, supra note 23, at 236 (arguing that there is a “critical need for alternative 
and effective forms of correctional oversight” in a post-PLRA world); Hill, supra note 184, at 
227 (proposing that “an organization called Prison Lawyers be established in the Ninth Circuit 
as a pilot program to provide attorney assistance for inmates in all civil rights claims”); KAUL 
ET AL., supra note 114, at 3–4 (recommending how to make grievance policies more fair 
because grievance policies serve a court gatekeeper function assigned by the PLRA). 
 268. See supra notes 22–42 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra notes 66–73 and accompanying text. 
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health care, and unsafe living conditions.271  Moreover, they can serve as an 
early-warning system of problematic practices or conditions that may 
become widespread absent deliberate correction.272  Even if claims may 
ultimately be unsubstantiated, the claim itself can help officials identify 
potentially bad actors.273  Without a steady flow of viable inmate civil rights 
lawsuits, this early-warning system fails, leading to bigger problems down 
the road. 
Third, combatting the PLRA’s application to meritorious civil rights 
lawsuits is in the public interest.  With billions of taxpayer dollars pouring 
into the operation of correctional facilities nationwide, the public has a right 
to know what occurs behind prison walls.274  Recent events, most notably the 
COVID-19 crisis, have sparked public attention to issues in prisons, as it has 
become clear that what happens inside prisons can directly impact the public 
health and safety of not only those physically incarcerated but also the public 
at large.275  For all of these reasons, there is a need to ensure that prisoners 
with meritorious claims can have their complaints heard in court. 
B.  A Framework for Combatting the PLRA’s Application to Meritorious 
Lawsuits 
States are best equipped to counteract the PLRA’s negative effects, as the 
majority of incarcerated persons in the United States are housed in state 
prisons276 and the administration of grievance procedures is determined by 
state processes.277  This Note proposes that states follow a two-step 
framework.  First, as Part III.B.1 explains, states should conduct prison 
grievance processes primarily via electronic means to ensure that all 
grievances are stored in electronic databases.  Second, as Part III.B.2 
describes, states should require that outside legal aid organizations litigating 
prisoner civil rights cases be given access to prisons’ electronic grievance 
databases. 
As a practical matter, this Note neither encourages a particular means of 
adoption nor provides which specific organizations must have access, as it 
recognizes that each state’s political makeup is different and that each state 
has different local organizations that litigate prisoner civil rights cases.  With 
that said, states can implement this Note’s proposed framework through 
 
 271. See Sturm, supra note 226, at 12–13. 
 272. See Tom Robbins, New York State Prisons Take Steps to Track Complaints About 
Guards, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/21/nyregion/new-
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officers). 
 273. See id. (quoting Karen L. Murtagh, the executive director of Prisoners’ Legal Services 
of New York, claiming that “[i]f you are serious about identifying bad actors, . . . you should 
be tracking the cases that have been filed against them, substantiated or not”). 
 274. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 275. See Deitch, supra note 35, at 213. 
 276. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 277. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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legislation, administrative regulation by the state DOC, or gubernatorial 
authority.  This Note’s proposal is thus broadly envisioned to promote 
practical adoption among numerous states.  Moreover, this Note’s proposed 
framework not only offers a practical means to collaterally attack the PLRA’s 
application to meritorious prisoner lawsuits but also can spark a lively debate 
over how to best navigate a post-PLRA reality. 
1.  Step One:  Implementing Electronic Grievance Systems 
States should ensure that prison grievance processes are conducted 
primarily via electronic means to ensure that all grievances are then stored in 
electronic databases.  While some state prison systems have electronic data 
systems to store information pertaining to grievances, those data systems 
typically require manual entry by prison staff, who sometimes only log 
grievances into the system if they are filled out correctly.278  In recent years, 
however, several state prison systems have begun to make,279 or have made, 
the transition from all paper forms by implementing kiosks or providing 
electronic tablets made by private companies, such as JPAY.280  Having an 
electronic means through which to submit, process, and track grievances also 
allows states to further standardize the grievance process and simplify it as 
much as possible. 
In providing an electronic means to submit and track grievances which can 
enable further standardization of forms, inmates may have a better chance of 
satisfying the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.  For inmates, the ability to 
electronically submit a grievance can place greater confidence in the 
grievance system, as inmates can fully control their submissions.281  Such a 
system also benefits the staff overseeing the grievance process, as they no 
 
 278. See, e.g., Goodrick v. Field, No. 17-CV-265, 2020 WL 6371160, at *2 (D. Idaho Oct. 
29, 2020).  According to the Idaho DOC’s grievance system, upon receipt of a grievance form 
from an inmate, the grievance coordinator enters the grievance information into the 
“Corrections Integrated System,” which is an electronic database used to log offender 
grievances and grievance appeals. Id.  The grievance coordinator, however, only logs the 
information into the database if an inmate completes the grievance form correctly. Id.  
Otherwise, the form is returned to the inmate. Id. 
 279. See, e.g., PRISON L. OFF., HOW TO FILE A CDCR ADMINISTRATIVE GRIEVANCE AND 
APPEAL 4 (2020), https://prisonlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/AdminAppeals-June-
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/MBE7-JSBH] (mentioning that inmates in some California state 
prison facilities may be able to submit grievances through electronic kiosks or tablets). 
 280. See, e.g., Nance v. SCO Francis Danley, No. 17-6409, 2021 WL 2592931, at *2 
(D.N.J. June 23, 2021) (referencing the New Jersey DOC’s electronic JPAY System for 
submitting grievances electronically via the unit kiosk); State ex rel. Wolfenbarger v. Mohr, 
No. 18AP-508, 2019 WL 4447406, at *4 app. (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2019) (describing how, 
in 2017, the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction implemented JPAY grievance 
kiosks and replaced its paper-based grievance procedure with an electronic system); Ga. Dep’t 
of Corr., Standard Operating Procedures (2019), https://www.powerdms.com/public/ 
GADOC/documents/105711 [https://perma.cc/LX6X-Z6WK]. 
 281. Cf. Goodrick, 2020 WL 6371160, at *2 (describing the limited discretion that the 
Idaho grievance process leaves to the grievance coordinator over whether to upload the 
grievance information into the database); PRISON JUST. LEAGUE, supra note 166, at 20 (noting 
that in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice grievance staff misplace or lose Texas state 
prisoners’ grievances in some cases). 
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longer need to spend time logging grievances themselves.  Instead, they can 
focus on addressing the underlying issues presented by the grievances.282 
Several states have already understood the added benefits of an electronic 
grievance system.283  Using paper forms, on the other hand, can create a 
whole host of problems.  For example, in December 2015, the New York 
Times reported how Eastern District of New York Judge John Gleeson 
rebuked the New York State grievance process when presiding over a former 
inmate’s case, which alleged prison guard abuse.284  Judge Gleeson stated 
that the particular guard had been the target of other abuse claims brought by 
inmates, but that those grievances were handwritten and deeply buried away 
in the prison’s arcane filing system.285  At the time, prison officials had no 
way of adequately tracking potential problems with particular guards.286  
However, in response to criticism, the New York State Department of 
Corrections and Community Supervision indicated that it had begun 
electronically logging complaints to allow the department to better monitor 
accusations of misconduct and change bad practices.287 
Despite these potential benefits, the primary anticipated objection to 
making this transition is financial.  For states that do not have a system in 
place already, implementing a database and kiosks or electronic tablets, can 
be a costly undertaking.  Moreover, given that some states have complicated 
their grievance procedures and enacted their own analogous PLRA schemes, 
there is some doubt as to whether states would be open to making a process 
more seamless.288  However, in the long term, having a system that allows 
state officials to spend more time addressing grievances and monitoring for 
potential problems generates significant cost savings and improves prison 
conditions overall, leading to state officials facing less costly lawsuits in the 
future.  This reasoning is consistent with the Supreme Court’s assumption in 
Woodford that “[c]orrections officials concerned about maintaining order in 
their institutions have a reason for creating and retaining grievance systems 
that provide—and that are perceived by prisoners as providing—a 
meaningful opportunity for prisoners to raise meritorious grievances.”289  
The fact that some states have already undergone the transition to electronic 
systems signals recognition that the benefits outweigh any anticipated costs. 
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2.  Step Two:  Granting Outside Legal Aid Organizations Access to 
Electronic Grievance Databases 
The first step serves as a prerequisite for implementing the second step.  
Once states have electronic grievance processes with corresponding 
databases in place, states should ensure the appropriate legal aid 
organizations that typically litigate prisoner civil rights cases are provided 
with database access.  With instant access to prisons’ grievance databases, 
these organizations can monitor grievances and identify prisoners’ 
apparently meritorious complaints, which are thus worthy of attorney 
representation.  Once identified, these organizations can decide whether to 
assist selected inmates through the prison grievance process to ensure that, if 
prisoners wish to file lawsuits, they will have properly exhausted their 
administrative remedies per Woodford.290  If an organization does not have 
the capacity to take on a particular case,291 it can reach out to private law 
firms to determine whether the firms can provide pro bono assistance.  This 
part of the framework therefore envisions not only an initial sharing of 
grievances with appropriate legal aid organizations but also a collaboration 
between public and private attorneys to better connect lawyers willing to take 
on prisoners’ civil rights lawsuits with prisoners themselves. 
This Note argues that such a process can directly counteract the PLRA’s 
access provisions’ cumulative application to meritorious prisoner civil rights 
lawsuits.  First, having a more seamless process to connect inmates with pro 
bono lawyers from the initial filing of a grievance enhances the probability 
of attorney representation prior to filing a civil rights complaint in court, thus 
increasing the odds the complaint will survive dismissal.292  As mentioned 
previously, inmates have not historically had such a process, and this lack of 
a process has contributed to the existing difficulties in finding lawyers ready 
to take on prisoner civil rights cases.293  This proposal therefore combats the 
disincentives exacerbated by the PLRA’s attorney’s fee limitations by 
connecting inmates with meritorious claims to attorneys who are willing to 
assist.294 
Second, having attorney representation from the start of the grievance 
process ensures that inmates are counseled to properly exhaust administrative 
remedies.  With many people in prison suffering from a combination of 
 
 290. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text. 
 292. See supra notes 79–84 and accompanying text.  As described previously, when an 
inmate moves to appoint counsel in a given case, it typically occurs after they already may 
have made errors warranting dismissal. 
 293. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 294. This Note’s proposal seeks to build on preexisting infrastructure to connect attorneys 
with prisoners who have meritorious civil rights claims.  However, others have argued for the 
creation of a new organization to provide inmates with legal assistance for their civil rights 
claims. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 184, at 226–34 (arguing for the creation of a new 
organization called Prison Lawyers, which would be funded by the Ninth Circuit). 
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different disadvantages, including illiteracy, legal assistance throughout the 
grievance process can make a significant difference in outcome.295 
Third, although this Note’s proposal directly targets the PLRA’s 
administrative exhaustion and attorney’s fee provisions, it can indirectly and 
positively impact the filing fee and three-strikes rule provisions.296  For 
example, pro bono attorneys can assist with covering the initial filing fee to 
avoid the case’s outright dismissal, even if an inmate has previously acquired 
three strikes, thus lessening the financial burden on inmates filing a civil 
rights lawsuit.  Additionally, attorney representation from the very start can 
help inmates avoid any pitfalls that may lead to acquiring a “strike.” 
This Note’s proposal ultimately aims to facilitate and restore federal 
litigation as a critical transparency mechanism for people in America’s 
prisons.  Allowing prisoner grievances to be instantly accessible to outside 
lawyers provides prisoners with meritorious claims an opportunity to share 
their otherwise hidden experiences with the outside world.  Doing so also 
creates an ongoing external oversight mechanism to continuously monitor 
the issues affecting people in prison on a daily basis. 
Aside from electronic grievance database sharing, this proposal builds on 
already existing infrastructure in some states.  For example, PLS—an 
established nonprofit organization that litigates New York prisoners’ civil 
rights cases—has a Pro Bono Partnership Program (PBPP) that aims to 
expand legal services to prisoners by recruiting attorneys to represent 
prisoners on a pro bono basis.297  The PBPP receives cases from PLS, 
conducts an initial review of the merits of those cases, and upon determining 
that a case is worthy of representation, PBPP staff contact volunteers 
individually to arrange for a case referral.298  This Note’s proposal capitalizes 
on this sort of existing infrastructure while streamlining the process by which 
a legal aid organization is made aware of prisoners’ complaints in the first 
place. 
Despite the potential benefits of this second step, state DOCs are likely to 
be wary of exposing daily prison life to outsiders.  State DOCs may not want 
increased external scrutiny of prisons coming from independent legal 
organizations.  In line with responses to public disclosure requests, they are 
likely to insulate information about prison conditions as much as possible.299  
However, unlike public disclosure requests, prisoners’ grievances would not 
be shared with the public at large, avoiding any concerns regarding the 
security or safety of the facility itself and those inside.  Moreover, having 
independent oversight by external legal aid organizations is beneficial in the 
long term, as it increases transparency of prison conditions to those whose 
 
 295. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra Parts II.B.2–3. 
 297. See Pro Bono Partnership Program, PRISONERS’ LEGAL SERVS. OF N.Y., 
https://plsny.org/pro-bono-partnership-program/ [https://perma.cc/6VS3-UA63] (last visited 
Aug. 9, 2021). 
 298. See id. 
 299. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
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mission it is to ultimately improve them.300  While such external involvement 
may seem, at first glance, to benefit only incarcerated individuals, it can also 
create safer institutions for correctional staff,301 providing an additional 
critical incentive for implementing such a framework.  While this Note’s 
proposed framework is just a first step, it aims to make significant strides to 
ensure that the intended purpose of the PLRA is fulfilled, although no longer 
at the expense of meritorious prisoner civil litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted the PLRA to reduce the perceived rise in frivolous 
prisoner litigation.  Despite statements to the contrary, the PLRA’s access 
provisions deter and obstruct prisoners’ ability to file and succeed on 
meritorious civil rights claims.  With recent events such as the COVID-19 
pandemic leaving people in prison more vulnerable than ever before and 
without indication that the PLRA will be significantly amended or repealed, 
states must begin to take proactive steps to counteract the PLRA’s effect on 
meritorious prisoner lawsuits.  This Note’s proposed framework is suggested 
as a practical means not only to collaterally attack the PLRA’s provisions 
restricting prisoners’ access to court but also to facilitate a meaningful debate 
over how to best navigate a reality in which the PLRA remains intact. 
 
 300. See Deitch, supra note 23, at 236 (arguing for creativity and increased transparency 
in prison operations). 
 301. See Deitch, supra note 35, at 219–21 (explaining how, although correctional 
administrators often give the greatest pushback to external oversight, they nevertheless are the 
second beneficiaries of such oversight). 
